![]() ![]() Large blocks of encoded PowerShell (FromBase64String, EncodedCommand).DownloadString / IEX downloads for localhost ().If you do have PowerShell logging enabled, then look for Unfortunately PowerShell auditing (logging) is not always enabled in corporate environments (as was the case for the IR for which I did this post). Because so many attacks make use of PowerShell in one way or another (not only for Cobalt Strike), it is a treasure cave for doing incident response. PowerShell logging is essential to further identify Cobalt Strike activity. See also the blog from NVISO Anatomy of Cobalt Strike’s DLL Stager. Because Cobalt Strike uses named pipes to deliver shellcode you should make sure your sandbox emulates named pipes as otherwise Cobalt Strike might not find its shellcode. Also see the blog of F-Secure Detecting Cobalt Strike Default Modules via Named Pipe Analysis and a list of malleable profiles (including the different pipe names) from Michael Haag.Ī last remark on named pipes. For example mimikatz (8 chars) will have a named pipe name of 8 characters long. or for named pipes with a seaming-less random name.Īs an additional note, the number of characters of the name of the named pipe is a giveaway for what command is being issued.for 32-bit processes (syswow32) using named pipes.at processes which normally would not use named pipes.Note that the list of named pipes can provide you hints of other machines most likely also affected by the intrusion (for example if the named pipe has references to machine names/IPs for post exploitation or SMB beacons).įor an initial triage and to reduce the volume of results it makes sense to look only In Volatility you can list the named pipes via the handles command and specify the process PID. The configuration of these named pipes can be changed, but in a lot of cases attackers will just stick to the default settings. ![]()
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